Oxford Studies of Time in Language and Thought 6 - Temporal Experience

Many physical theories suggest that time does not pass, yet temporality deeply permeates our experience. We perceive change and movement, we are aware of living in the present, of the constant flux of our sensations and thoughts, and of time itself flowing. In Temporal Experience, Torrengo considers the core facts of temporal experience and their interconnections, ultimately defending the atomist dynamic model of temporal experience. The book critically examines prevalent theories of experience of change, succession, and passage of time both in philosophy and psychology. Each chapter contributes to the construction of the atomist dynamic model. Experience of change and movement are explained through mental events that present virtually instantaneous movement and change. Torrengo challenges the common belief in the perception of 'presentness' and proposes an error theory based on narrative cognition. The experience of succession is elucidated through the concept of an overarching phenomenology, arguing against the tendency to overstate the phenomenal continuity of experience. Finally, the experience of the passage of time is approached through the non-representationalist theory of the phenomenal modifier, and the book concludes by discussing the surprising consequences of applying the experiential model defended to the scientific image of our existence in time as a sequence of physical events.